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Introduction  
The term cyberterrorism unites two significant modern fears: fear of 
technology and fear of terrorism. Both of these fears are evidenced in this quote from 
Walter Laqueur, one of the most well known figures in terrorism studies: “The 
electronic age has now made cyberterrorism possible. A onetime mainstay of science 
fiction, the doomsday machine, looms as a real danger. The conjunction of technology 
and terrorism make for an uncertain and frightening future.”1 It is not only academics 
that are given to sensationalism. Cyberterrorism first became the focus of sustained 
analysis by government in the mid-1990s. In 1996 John Deutch, former director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), testified before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations of the United States’ Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: 
 International terrorist groups clearly have the capability to attack the 
information infrastructure of the United States, even if they use relatively simple 
means. Since the possibilities for attacks are not difficult to imagine, I am concerned 
about the potential for such attacks in the future. The methods used could range from 
such traditional terrorist methods as a vehicle-delivered bomb -- directed in this 
instance against, say, a telephone switching centre or other communications node -- to 
electronic means of attack. The latter methods could rely on paid hackers. The ability 
to launch an attack, however, are likely to be within the capabilities of a number of 
terrorist groups, which themselves have increasingly used the Internet and other 
modern means for their own communications.2 
 Both the popularity and, to some extent, the credibility of such scenarios was 
given a boost by the entertainment industry. Hollywood, eager to capitalise on the 
cyberterrorist threat, released the James Bond film Goldeneye in 1995. Other sectors 
were quick to follow with the publishing industry introducing Tom Clancy and Steve 
R. Pieczenik’s Net Force series in 1998.   As Ralf Bendrath has pointed out: 
“Sometimes it is hard to tell what is science and what is fiction. Winn 
Schwartau, for example, the rock manager turned preacher of ‘information 
warfare’ who runs the famous website infowar.com, has testified several times 
as an IT security expert before Congress, and has written two novels on cyber-
terror. Even renowned cyber-war theoreticians like John Arquilla have not 
hesitated to publish thrilling cyber-terror scenarios for the general audience.  
But these works are not only made for entertainment. They produce certain 
visions of the future and of the threats and risks looming there.”3  
 
In 1998 the Global Organized Crime Project of the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington DC published a report entitled Cybercrime, 
Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo. This was the first 
major academic contribution to the field. The document’s authors view cyberterrorism 
as a sub-species of Information Warfare (IW). This is because information warfare is 
a form of asymmetric warfare and is therefore viewed as an eminently suitable 
terrorist strategy. Cyberterrorism has since come to be viewed as a component allied 
to offensive information warfare, but one that has a direct corollary in traditional, 
physical, non-information based ‘warfare’ (i.e. classical political terrorism). In other 
words, cyberterrorism is recognised as having links with traditional terrorist tactics, 
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but may be viewed as a new strategy employing new tools and exploiting new 
dependencies.  
 Although the author’s of the CSIS report fail to provide a definition of what it 
is they mean by ‘cyberterrorism,’ they are at pains to illustrate its potentially 
disastrous consequences: 
A smoking keyboard does not convey the same drama as a smoking 
gun, but it has already proved just as destructive. Armed with the tools of 
Cyberwarfare, substate or nonstate or even individual actors are now powerful 
enough to destabilise and eventually destroy targeted states and societies… 
Information warfare specialists at the Pentagon estimate that a properly 
prepared and well-coordinated attack by fewer than 30 computer virtuosos 
strategically located around the world, with a budget of less than $10 million, 
could bring the United States to its knees. Such a strategic attack, mounted by 
a cyberterrorist group, either substate or nonstate actors, would shut down 
everything from electric power grids to air traffic control centers.4  
A focus on such ‘shut-down-the-power-grid’ scenarios is increasingly a feature of 
analyses of the cyberterrorist threat.5 
This chapter is concerned with explicating the origins and development of the concept 
of cyberterrorism with a view to separating the hype surrounding the issue from the 
more prosaic reality. This is more difficult than it may at first appear, however. Ralf 
Bendrath has identified three major stumbling blocks.6 First, this debate is not simply 
about predicting the future, but is also about how to prepare for it (i.e. the future) in 
the present. The problem is that those involved in the debate cannot draw on either 
history or experience to bolster their positions, as a major cyberterrorist incident has 
never yet occurred. For this reason different scenarios or stories about the possible 
course of future events are providing the grounds on which decisions must be made. 
The upshot of this is that the various actors (i.e. government and opposition, the 
computer security industry, the media-entertainment complex, scholars, and others) 
with their various, and often times divergent, interests are competing with each other 
by means of their versions of the future, which are particularly subject to political 
exploitation and instrumentation.  
A second, and related, problem is the nature of the space in which a 
cyberterrorist attack would occur: 
“In the physical landscape of the real world, any action has its 
constraints in the laws of nature…Cyberspace, in contrast, is a landscape 
where every action is possible only because the technical systems provide an 
artificial environment that is built to allow it. The means of attack therefore 
change from system to system, from network to network. This makes threat 
estimation and attack recognition much more difficult tasks.”7  
Bendrath’s final point relates to the highly technical nature of the new threat and the 
constraints this places on social scientists and their ability to estimate the magnitude 
of that threat. Bendrath’s solution is for social scientists to draw conclusions by 
looking at how the threat is perceived: “The way a problem is framed normally 
determines or at least limits the possible solutions for it.”8  
With this in mind, this paper seeks to excavate the story of the concept of 
cyberterrorism through an analysis of both popular/media renditions of the term and 
scholarly attempts to define its borders. It must be stated at the outset that, in both 
media and academic realms, confusion abounds. This is startling, particularly given 
that since the events of 9-11, the question on everybody’s lips appears to be ‘Is 
Cyberterrorism Next?’9 In academic circles the answer is generally ‘not yet.’ The 
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media are less circumspect, however, and policy makers appear increasingly to be 
seduced by the latter’s version of events. It seems to me that both question and 
answer(s) are hampered by the lack of certainty surrounding the central term. Let me 
begin by putting forward some concrete illustrations of this definitional void culled 
from newspaper accounts. 
 
Cyberterrorists Abound 
In June 2001 a headline in the Boston Herald read ‘Cyberterrorist Must Serve 
Year in Jail.’10 The story continued: “Despite a Missouri cyberterrorist’s plea for 
leniency, a Middlesex Superior Court judge yesterday told the wheelchair-bound man 
‘you must be punished for what you’ve done’ to Massachusetts schoolchildren and 
ordered him to serve a year in jail.” The defendant, pleaded guilty to “launching a 
campaign of terror via the Internet” from his Missouri home, including directing 
Middle School students to child pornography Web sites he posted, telephoning threats 
to the school and to the homes of some children, and posting a picture of the school’s 
principal with bullet holes in his head and chest on the Net.  
In December 2001 a headline in the Bristol Herald Courier, Wise County, Virginia, 
USA read ‘Wise County Circuit Court’s Webcam “Cracked” by Cyberterrorists.’11 
The webcam, which allows surfers to log on and watch the Wise County Circuit 
Courts in action, was taken offline for two weeks for repairs. “(Expletive Deleted) the 
United States Government” was posted on a web page. However, the defaced page 
could only be seen by the Court’s IT contractors; Internet surfers who logged on could 
only see a blank screen. The ‘attack’ is though to have originated in Pakistan or 
Egypt, according to the report. “This is the first cyberterrorism on the court’s Internet 
technology, and it clearly demonstrates the need for constant vigilance,” according to 
Court Clerk Jack Kennedy. “The damage in this case amounted to a $400 hard drive 
relating to the Internet video server. The crack attack has now resulted in better 
software and enhanced security to avoid a [sic] further cyberterrorism.” According to 
Kennedy, cracking can escalate to terrorism when a person cracks into a government- 
or military-maintained Web site; he said cyberterrorism has increased across the 
United States since the events of 9-11 and law enforcement has traced many of the 
attacks to Pakistan and Egypt.  It was predicted that an escalation in hack attacks 
would occur in the aftermath of 9-11.12  However, the predicted escalation did not 
materialise. In the weeks following the attacks, Web page defacements were well 
publicised, but the overall number and sophistication of these remained rather low. 
One possible reason for the non-escalation of attacks could be that many hackers- 
particularly those located in the US- were wary of being associated with the events of 
September 11th and curbed their activities as a result.  
 In March 2002, linkLINE Communications, described as “a small, but 
determined Internet service provider” located in Mira Loma, California received 
telephone and e-mail threats from an unnamed individual who claimed to have 
accessed- or be able to access- the credit card numbers of linkLINE’s customers. He 
said that he would sell the information and notify linkLINE’s customers if $50,000 
wasn’t transferred to a bank account number that he supplied. The ISP refused to 
concede to the cracker’s demands: “We’re not going to let our customers, or our 
reputation, be the victims of cyber-terrorism,” said one of the company’s founders. 
linkLINE contacted the authorities and learned that the cracker and his accomplices 
may have extorted as much as $4 billion from other companies. The account was 
subsequently traced through Russia to Yemen.13 
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A similar incident had taken place in November 2000. An attack, originating 
in Pakistan, was carried out against the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a 
lobbying group. The group’s site was defaced with anti-Israeli commentary.  The 
attacker also stole some 3,500 e-mail addresses and 700 credit card numbers, sent 
anti-Israeli diatribes to the addresses and published the credit card data on the 
Internet. The Pakistani hacker who took credit for the crack, the self-styled Dr. Nuker, 
said he was a founder of the Pakistani Hackerz Club, the aim of which was to “hack 
for the injustice going around the globe, especially with [sic] Muslims.”14 In May 
2001 ‘cyberterrorism’ reared its head once again when supporters of the terrorist 
group Laskar Jihad (Holy War Warriors) hacked into the website of Australia’s 
Indonesian embassy and the Indonesian national police in Jakarta to protest against 
the arrest of their leader. The hackers intercepted users logging on to the Web sites 
and redirected them to a site containing a warning to the Indonesian police to release 
Ja’far Umar Thalib, the group’s leader. Thalib was arrested in connection with 
inciting hatred against a religious group and ordering the murder of one of his 
followers. According to police, the hackers, the self-styled Indonesian Muslim 
Hackers Movement, did not affect police operations. The Australian embassy said the 
hackers did not sabotage its Web site, but only directed users to the other site. 
It is clear that the pejorative connotations of the terms ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist’ have resulted in some unlikely acts of computer abuse being labelled 
‘cyberterrorism’. According to the above, sending pornographic e-mails to minors, 
posting offensive content on the Internet, defacing Web pages, using a computer to 
cause $400 worth of damage, stealing credit card information, posting credit card 
numbers on the Internet, and clandestinely redirecting Internet traffic from one site to 
another all constitute instances of cyberterrorism. And yet none of it could be 
described as terrorism - some of it not even criminal - had it taken place without the 
aid of computers. Admittedly, terrorism is a notoriously difficult activity to define; 
however, the addition of computers to plain old criminality it is not.  
 
The Origins of Cyberterrorism 
Barry Collin, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security and 
Intelligence in California, coined the term ‘cyberterrorism’ in the mid-1980s.15 The 
idea of terrorists utilising communications technologies to target critical infrastructure 
was first mooted more than two decades ago, however. In 1977, Robert Kupperman, 
then Chief Scientist of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, stated: 
“Commercial aircraft, natural gas pipelines, the electric power grid, 
offshore oil rigs, and computers storing government and corporate records are 
examples of sabotage-prone targets whose destruction would have derivative 
effects of far higher intensity than their primary losses would suggest. Thirty 
years ago terrorists could not have obtained extraordinary leverage. Today, 
however, the foci of communications, production and distribution are 
relatively small in number and highly vulnerable.”16  
Such fears crystallised with the advent of the Internet. The opening chapter of 
Computers at Risk (1991), one of the foundation books in the US computer security 
field, which was commissioned and published by the US National Academy of 
Sciences, begins as follows: 
“We are at risk. America depends on computers. They control power 
delivery, communications, aviation, and financial services. They are used to 
store vital information, from medical records to business plans to criminal 
records. Although we trust them, they are vulnerable – to the effects of poor 
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design and insufficient quality control, to accident, and perhaps most 
alarmingly, to deliberate attack. The modern thief can steal more with a 
computer than with a gun. Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more 
damage with a keyboard than with a bomb.”17  
Nevertheless, cyberterrorism only became the object of sustained academic analysis 
and media attention in the mid-1990s. It was the advent of and then the increasing 
spread of the World Wide Web (WWW) along with the vocal protestations of John 
Deutch, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as to the potentiality 
of the Web as a terrorist tool and/or target that kick-started research into the 
phenomenon of cyberterrorism in the United States. 
 
From ‘Real World’ Terrorism to Cyberterrorism 
It has been pointed out that if you ask 10 people what ‘cyberterrorism’ is, you 
will get at least nine different answers.18 This discrepancy bears more than a grain of 
truth, as there are a number of stumbling blocks to constructing a clear and concise 
definition of cyberterrorism. Chief among these are the following: 
• A majority of the discussion of cyberterrorism has been conducted in the 
popular media, where the focus is on ratings and readership figures rather than 
establishing good operational definitions of new terms.  
• The term is subject to chronic misuse and overuse and since 9/11, in 
particular, has become a buzzword that can mean radically different things to 
different people.  
• It has become common when dealing with computers and the Internet to create 
new words by placing the handle cyber, computer, or information before 
another word. This may appear to denote a completely new phenomenon, but 
often it does not and confusion ensues.   
• Finally, a major obstacle to creating a definition of cyberterrorism is the lack 
of an agreed-upon definition of terrorism more generally.19 
This does not mean that no acceptable definitions of cyberterrorism have been put 
forward. On the contrary, there are a number of well thought out definitions of the 
term available, and these are discussed below.  One of the most accessible sound bites 
on what defines cyberterrorism is that it is ‘hacking with a body count.’20  However, 
no single definition of cyberterrorism is agreed upon by all, in the same way that no 
single, globally accepted definition of classical political terrorism exists.   
Mark M. Pollitt’s article ‘Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy?,’ published in 
Computer Fraud and Security in 1998, made a significant contribution with regard to 
the definition of cyberterrorism. Pollitt points out, as many others fail to do, that the 
concept of cyberterrorism is composed of two elements: cyberspace and terrorism. 
Cyberspace may be conceived of as “that place in which computer programs function 
and data moves.”21 ‘Cyberspace’ as a term has its origins in science fiction writing. It 
first appeared in William Gibson’s 1984 novel Neuromancer, which featured a world 
called cyberspace, after Cyber, the most powerful computer.22  Terrorism is a less 
easily defined term. In fact, most scholarly texts devoted to the study of terrorism 
contain a section, chapter, or chapters devoted to a discussion of how difficult it is to 
define the term.23 In his paper Pollitt employs the definition of terrorism contained in 
Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d).  That statute contains the 
following definition:  
“The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”  
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Pollitt combines Collin’s definition of cyberspace and the US Department of State’s 
definition of terrorism which results in the construction of a narrowly drawn working 
definition of cyberterrorism as follows:  
“Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack 
against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which 
result in violence against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
clandestine agents.”24  
A similar definition of cyberterrorism has been put forward by Dorothy Denning in 
numerous articles and interviews, and in her testimony on the subject before the 
United States Congress’s House Armed Services Committee. According to Denning: 
“Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It 
refers to unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks 
and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a 
government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence 
against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. 
Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss 
would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infrastructures could be 
acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt 
nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.”25  
Pollitt and Denning are two of only a very small number of authors to recognise and 
make explicit the way in which the word ‘cyberterrorism’ is meaningless in and of 
itself and that it is only the relational elements of which the word is composed that 
imbue it with meaning.26 A majority of authors appear to overlook this connection. In 
fact, numerous authors of articles dealing explicitly with cyberterrorism provide no 
definition of their object of study at all.27  
Utilising the definitions provided by Denning and Pollitt, the ‘attack’ on the 
Web-cam of the Wise County Circuit Court does not qualify as cyberterrorism, nor do 
any of the other ‘cyberterrorist attacks’ outlined earlier. It’s hardly surprising; the 
inflation of the concept of cyberterrorism may increase newspaper circulation, but is 
ultimately not in the public interest. Despite this, many scholars (and others) have 
suggested adopting broader definitions of the term. Many authors do this implicitly by 
falling into the trap of either conflating hacking and cyberterrorism or confusing cyber 
crime with cyberterrorism, while a number of authors fall into both of these traps. 
Such missteps are less arbitrary than they may first appear however, as two important 
academic contributions explicitly allow for such a broadening of the definition of 
cyberterrorism.  
 
Virtual Violence 
Traditional terrorism generally involves violence or threats of violence. 
However, despite the prevalent portrayal of traditional violence in virtual 
environments, ‘cyber violence’ is still very much an unknown quantity. It is accepted, 
for example, that the destruction of another’s computer with a hammer is a violent act. 
But should destruction of the data contained in that machine, whether by the 
introduction of a virus or some other technological means, also be considered 
‘violence’?28 This question goes right to the heart of the definition of cyberterrorism. 
In a seminal article, published in the journal Terrorism and Political Violence 
in 1997, Devost, Houghton, and Pollard defined ‘information terrorism’ as “the 
intentional abuse of a digital information system, network or component toward an 
end that supports or facilitates a terrorist campaign or action.”29 They conceive of 
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information terrorism as “the nexus between criminal information system fraud or 
abuse, and the physical violence of terrorism.”30 This allows for attacks that would 
not necessarily result in violence against humans - although it might incite fear - to be 
characterised as terrorist. This is problematic because, although there is no single 
accepted definition of terrorism, more than 80% of scholars agree that the latter has 
two integral components: the use of force or violence and a political motivation.31 
Indeed, most domestic laws define classical or political terrorism as requiring 
violence or the threat to or the taking of human life for political or ideological ends. 
Devost, Houghton, and Pollard are aware of this, but wish to allow for the inclusion of 
pure information system abuse (i.e. that does not employ nor result in physical 
violence) as a possible new facet of terrorism nonetheless.32  
Nelson et al’s reasoning as to why disruption, as opposed to destruction, of 
information infrastructures ought to fall into the category of cyberterrorism is quite 
different: 
“Despite claims to the contrary, cyberterrorism has only a limited 
ability to produce the violent effects associated with traditional terrorist acts. 
Therefore, to consider malicious activity in cyberspace ‘terrorism,’ it is 
necessary to extend existing definitions of terrorism to include the destruction 
of digital property. The acceptance of property destruction as terrorism allows 
this malicious activity, when combined with the necessary motivations, to be 
defined as Cyberterror.”33  
As we have seen, Mark Pollitt employs the State Department’s definition of terrorism 
to construct his definition of cyberterrorism. Neither the State Department definition, 
nor Pollitt’s, specifically identifies actions taken against property as terrorism. 
According to Nelson et al, however, in practice the Title 22 definition “clearly 
includes the destruction of property as terrorism when the other conditions for 
terrorism are satisfied (premeditated, politically motivated, etc.).”34 In addition, the 
FBI definition of terrorism explicitly includes acts against property. However, Nelson 
et al point out that both the State Department and FBI definitions are subsumed by the 
Department of Defense definition contained in regulation O-2000.12-H, which 
includes “malicious property destruction” as a type of terrorist attack. This regulation 
also addresses destruction at the level of binary code, which it specifically refers to 
under the use of special weapons 
Use of sophisticated computer viruses introduced into computer-controlled 
systems for banking, information, communications, life support, and manufacturing 
could result in massive disruption of highly organised, technological societies. 
Depending on the scope, magnitude, and intensity of such disruptions, the populations 
of affected societies could demand governmental concessions to those responsible for 
unleashing viruses. Such a chain of events would be consistent with contemporary 
definitions of terrorist acts.”35 Taking the above into account, Nelson et al define 
cyberterrorism as follows: “Cyberterrorism is the unlawful destruction or disruption 
of digital property to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in the pursuit of 
goals that are political, religious or ideological.”36 The problem is that this definition 
massively extends the terrorist remit by removing the requirement for violence 
resulting in death and/or serious destruction from the definition of terrorism and 
lowering the threshold to “disruption of digital property.”  
 A related problem is that although Nelson et al are quite precise in their 
categorisations and repeatedly stress that the other conditions necessary for an act to 
be identified as terrorist must be satisfied (i.e. premeditation, political motivation, 
etc.) before disruptive cyber attacks may be classified as cyberterrorism, others are 
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less circumspect. Israel’s former science minister, Michael Eitan, has deemed 
“sabotage over the Internet” as cyberterrorism.37 According to the Japanese 
government ‘Cyberterrorism’ aims at “seriously affecting information systems of 
private companies and government ministries and agencies by gaining illegal access 
to their computer networks and destroying data.”38 A report by the Moscow-based 
ITAR-TASS news agency states that, in Russia, cyberterrorism is perceived as “the 
use of computer technologies for terrorist purposes.”39 Yael Shahar, Web master at 
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), located in Herzliya, 
Israel, differentiates between a number of different types of what he prefers to call 
‘information terrorism’: ‘electronic warfare’ occurs when hardware is the target, 
‘psychological warfare’ is the goal of inflammatory content, and it is only ‘hacker 
warfare’, according to Shahar, that degenerates into cyberterrorism.40  
 
Hacking versus Cyberterrorism 
‘Hacking’ is the term used to describe unauthorised access to or use of a 
computer system. The term ‘hacktivism’ is composed of the words ‘hacking’ and 
‘activism’ and is the handle used to describe politically motivated hacking. ‘Cracking’ 
refers to hacking with a criminal intent; the term is composed of the words ‘criminal’ 
and ‘hacking.’ In a majority of both media reports and academic analyses of 
cyberterrorism, one or other of these terms – hacking, hacktivism, cracking - or the 
activities associated with them are equated with or identified as variants of 
cyberterrorism. 
Hackers have many different motives. Many hackers work on gaining entry to 
systems for the challenge it poses. Others are seeking to educate themselves about 
systems. Some state that they search for security holes to notify system administrators 
while others perform intrusions to gain recognition from their peers. Hacktivists are 
politically motivated; they use their knowledge of computer systems to engage in 
disruptive activities on the Internet in the hopes of drawing attention to some political 
cause. These disruptions take many different forms, from ‘denial of service’ (DoS) 
attacks that tie up Web sites and other servers, to posting ‘electronic graffiti’ on the 
home pages of government and corporate Web sites, to the theft and publication of 
private information on the Internet. Crackers hack with the intent of stealing, altering 
data, or engaging in other malicious damage.41 A significant amount of cracking is 
carried out against businesses by former employees.  
 The term ‘hacker’ was originally applied to those early pioneers in computer 
programming who continually reworked and refined programs. This progressed, as 
Sprague explains, to the “displaying of feats of ingenuity and cleverness, in a 
productive manner, involving the use of computer systems.”42 Gaining unauthorised 
access to computer networks was one way of displaying such expertise. This original 
generation of hackers developed a code of practice, which has come to be known as 
the Hacker Ethic. It was premised on two principles, namely the free sharing of 
information and a prohibition against harming, altering, or destroying any information 
that was discovered through this activity. Over the course of time, however, “a new 
generation appropriated the word ‘hacker’ and with help from the press, used it to 
define itself as password pirates and electronic burglars. With that the public 
perceptions of hackers changed. Hackers were no longer seen as benign explorers but 
malicious intruders.”43 As a result, the classical computer hacker – bright teenagers 
and young adults who spend long hours in front of their computer screens – is now the 
‘cyberpunk.’  
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Hackers as Terrorists 
Much has been made of the similarities between profiles of terrorists and those 
of hackers. Both groups tend to be composed primarily of young, disaffected, males.44 
In the case of computer hackers, a distinct psychological discourse branding them the 
product of a pathological addiction to computers has emerged. In fact, a large number 
of hackers who have been tried before the criminal courts for their exploits have 
successfully used mental disturbance as a mitigating factor in their defence, and have 
thus received probation with counselling instead of jail time.45  
Hackers are commonly depicted as socially isolated and lacking in communication 
skills. Their alleged anger at authority is said to reduce the likelihood of their dealing 
with these frustrations directly and constructively. In addition, the flexibility of their 
ethical systems; lack of loyalty to individuals, institutions, and countries; and lack of 
empathy for others are said to reduce inhibitions against potentially damaging acts. At 
the same time, their description as lonely, socially naïve, and egotistical appears to 
make them vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation.46  
Some hackers have demonstrated a willingness to sell their skills to outsiders. 
The most famous example is the Hanover Hackers case. In 1986, a group of hackers 
in Hanover, Germany, began selling information they obtained through unlawfully 
accessing the computer systems of various Departments of Energy and Defence, a 
number of defence contractors, and the US Space Agency NASA, to the Soviet KGB. 
Their activities were discovered in 1988, but nearly two years elapsed before the 
group were finally identified and apprehended.47 During the first Gulf War, between 
April 1990 and May 1991, a group of Dutch hackers succeeded in accessing US 
Army, Navy, and Air Force systems. They sought to sell their skills and sensitive 
information they had obtained via the intrusions to Iraq, but were apprehended by 
police in the Netherlands.48  
According to Gregory Rattray, a majority of the analyses of hackers-for-hire - 
what he calls ‘cybersurrogates’ for terrorism - generally stress the ease49 and 
advantages of such outsourcing. These analysts presume that terrorist groups will be 
able to easily contact hackers-for-hire, while keeping their direct involvement hidden 
through the use of cut-outs and proxies. The hackers could then be employed to 
reconnoitre enemy information systems to identify targets and methods of access. 
Furthermore, it is posited that if hacker groups could be employed to actually commit 
acts of cyberterrorism, terrorist groups would improve their ability to avoid 
culpability or blame altogether. Rattray does flag the important risks and 
disadvantages to such schemes, however. First, seeking to employ hackers to commit 
acts not just of disruption, but of significant destruction that may involve killing 
people would in all likelihood prove considerably more difficult than buying 
information for the purposes of intelligence gathering. Second, simply contacting, 
never mind employing, would-be hackers-for-hire would subject terrorists to 
significant operational security risks. Third, terrorist organisations run the risk of 
cybersurrogates being turned into double agents by hostile governments. All three 
scenarios, Rattray admits, weigh heavily against the employment of cybersurrogacy as 
a strategy.50 
And these are not the only risks faced by terrorists planning to employ IT to 
carry out attacks. In their paper ‘The IW Threat from Sub-State Groups: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach’ (1997), Andrew Rathmell, Richard Overill, Lorenzo 
Valeri, and John Gearson point out that should the terrorists themselves lack sufficient 
computer expertise, there is the likelihood that they would recruit hackers who would 
prove insufficiently skilled to carry out the planned attacks. In addition, these authors 
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concur with Rattray that there is a strong case to be made for such hackers changing 
sides. This is because the primary motive of the hacker-for-hire is financial gain thus, 
given sufficient monetary inducement, such individuals are unlikely to object to 
reporting to other than their original ‘employer.’51   
David Tucker also has some interesting insights into the hacker-for-hire 
scenario. Based on a simulation in which he took part, which involved a hacker and 
members of a number of terrorist organizations.  Of the terrorists who took part in the 
conference/simulation that Tucker attended, one was a member of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), two were members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
(ETA), one from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and one from the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Tucker foresees potential 
organisational problems for any hacker-terrorist collaboration. He points out that on 
those occasions when hackers aren’t acting alone, they operate in flat, open-ended 
associations. This is the opposite of many terrorist groups, which are closed 
hierarchical organisations. There is certainly the potential for clashes between these 
different organisational styles, developed in different operating environments and 
derived from different psychological needs. Tucker reports that a former member of 
ETA who was involved in the simulation repeatedly stressed the need to belong and 
the strength of attachment to the group as characteristic of members of clandestine 
organisations.52 This is not a character trait typically associated with hackers. In fact, 
in the simulation in which Tucker took part, the hacker and the terrorists involved 
disagreed over tactics and had difficulty communicating. Eventually, these difficulties 
became so great that it resulted in a breakdown in the simulation group. The hacker 
and the terrorists were simply not able to work together. Tucker observes that if the 
breakdown can be generalised, it would have obvious consequences for hacker-
terrorist collaboration.53  
The only likely scenario, given the above, is cyber attacks carried out by 
terrorists with hacking skills.54 This is not impossible. “The current trend towards 
easier-to-use hacking tools indicates that this hurdle will not be as high in the future 
as it is today, even as it is significantly lower today than it was two years ago.”55 
According to William Church, a former US Army Intelligence Officer: 
“If you look at the Irish Republican Army, which was probably the 
closest before they made peace, they were on the verge of it. They had 
computer-oriented cells. They could have done it. They were already attacking 
the infrastructure by placing real or phoney bombs in electric plants, to see if 
they could turn off the lights in London. But they were still liking the feel of 
physical weapons, and trusting them.”56  
Terrorists are generally conservative in the adoption of new tools and tactics.57 
Factors influencing the adoption of some new tool or technology would include: the 
terrorist group’s knowledge and understanding of the tool, and their trust in it. 
Terrorists generally only put their trust in those tools that they have designed and built 
themselves, have experimented with, and know from experience will work. It’s for 
this reason that weapons and tools generally proliferate from states to terrorists.58  
O’Brien and Nusbaum suggest that intelligence agencies should utilise online chat 
forums, hacker Web sites, etc. to gather intelligence on contemporary asymmetric 
threats.  They suggest that most hackers possess a large degree of hubris with regards 
to their hacking knowledge and abilities as a result of which such “threat-savvy users” 
could be coaxed into revealing vulnerabilities they had discovered on the Net, as well 
as boasting about their own abilities and exploits.59  David Smith, the man responsible 
for transmitting the Melissa virus, helped the FBI bring down several major 
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international hackers. Smith used a fake online identity to communicate with and 
track other hackers from around the world. His intelligence gathering resulted in the 
arrest of both Jan DeWit, the author of the Anna Kournikova virus, and Simon Vallor, 
the author of the Gokar virus.60  This position is endorsed by Soo Hoo, Goodman, and 
Greenberg: 
“Foreign Bases of operation might be useful for intelligence-gathering 
activities, but again, they are not required for IT-enabled 
terrorism…[I]nformation about various systems’ vulnerabilities is often shared 
online between hackers on computer bulletin boards, Web sites, news groups 
and other forms of electronic association, and this information can be obtained 
without setting foot in the target country.”61  
It seems unlikely, however, that professional hackers or cyber mercenaries would 
engage in the cavalier behaviour described above: 
“While amateur hackers receive most publicity, the real threat are the 
professionals or ‘cyber mercenaries.’ This term refers to highly skilled and 
trained products of government agencies or corporate intelligence branches 
that work on the open market. The Colombian drug cartels hired cyber 
mercenaries to install and run a sophisticated secure communications system; 
Amsterdam-based gangs used professional hackers to monitor and disrupt the 
communications and information systems of police surveillance teams.”62  
There is no evidence of such mercenaries having carried out attacks under the 
auspices of known terrorist organisations, however.   
The US Department of Justice labelled Kevin Mitnick, probably the world’s 
most famous computer hacker, a “computer terrorist.”63 On his arraignment, Mitnick 
was denied access not only to computers, but also to a phone, “the judge believing 
that, with a phone and a whistle, Mitnick could set off a nuclear attack.”64  Before all-
digital switches made it possible for telephone companies to move them out of band, 
one could actually hear the switching tones used to route long-distance calls. 
‘Phreaking’ is the term used to describe the art and science of cracking the phone 
network. Early phreakers built devices called `blue boxes' that could reproduce these 
tones, which could be used to commandeer portions of the phone network. The 
reference above is to an early phreaker who acquired the sobriquet `Captain Crunch' 
after he proved that he could generate switching tones with a plastic whistle pulled out 
of a box of Captain Crunch cereal! But at no time did he seek to set off any nuclear 
device using this method.  Incredulity aside, hackers are unlikely to become terrorists, 
because their motives are divergent. Despite the allegedly similar personality traits 
shared by both terrorists and present-day hackers, the fact remains that terrorism is an 
extreme and violent occupation, and far more aberrant than prankish hacking. 
Although hackers have demonstrated that they are willing to crash computer networks 
to cause functional paralysis and even significant financial loss, this propensity for 
expensive mischief is not sufficient evidence that they would be willing to jeopardise 
lives or even kill for a political cause.65  
 
Hacktivism versus Cyberterrorism 
Hacktivism grew out of hacker culture, although there was little evidence of 
sustained political engagement by hackers prior to the mid-1990s.66 Nineteen ninety-
eight is viewed by many as the year in which hacktivism really took off.67  Probably 
the first incidence of hacktivism took place in 1989 when hackers with an anti-nuclear 
stance released a computer worm into NASA’s SPAN network. The worm carried the 
message “Worms Against Nuclear Killers…Your System has Been Officially 
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WANKed…You talk of times of peace for all, and then prepare for war.” At the time, 
anti-nuclear protesters were seeking to stop the launch of the shuttle that carried the 
plutonium-fuelled Galileo probe on the first leg of its voyage to Jupiter.68  It was in 
’98 that the US-based Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT) first employed it’s 
FloodNet software in an effort to crash various Mexican government Web sites to 
protest the treatment of indigenous peoples in Chiapas and support the actions of the 
Zapatista rebels.  FloodNet is a Java applet that, once the launching page has been 
accessed, repeatedly loads pages from targeted networks. If enough people participate 
in a FloodNet attack (i.e. access the launching page at a given date and window of 
time), the targeted computer will be brought to a halt, bombarded by too many 
commands for it to process. The FloodNet software is available at 
http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/floodnet.html.  Over 8,000 people participated in 
this, one of the first digital sit-ins.  Probably the very first such demonstration was 
carried out against the French government. On 21December 1995, a group called 
Strano Network launched a one-hour Net’Strike attack against Web sites operated by 
various French government agencies. It was reported that as least some of the sites 
were inaccessible during that time.69  It was also in ’98 that JF, a young British 
hacker, entered about 300 Web sites and replaced their home pages with anti-nuclear 
text and imagery. At that time, JF’s hack was the biggest political hack of its kind. 
‘Hacktions’ also took place in Australia, China, India, Portugal, Sweden, and 
elsewhere in the same year.70 Michael Vatis, one-time Director of the FBI’s National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), has labelled such acts as cyberterrorism.71  
Tim Jordan identifies two different types of hacktivism: Mass Virtual Direct Action 
(MVDA) and Individual Virtual Direct Action (IVDA). According to Jordan: 
“Mass Virtual Direct Action involves the simultaneous use, by many 
people, of the Internet to create electronic civil disobedience. It is named 
partly in homage to the dominant form of offline protest during the 1990s, 
non-violent direct action or NVDA.”72  
The FloodNet attack on the Mexican government Web sites described above 
was an example of MVDA as was the action against the 1999 World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) conference in Seattle. The organisers of the latter event, the UK-
based Electrohippies, estimated that over 450,000 people participated in their sit-in on 
the WTO Web site. In contrast to MVDA, IVDA utilises classical hacker/cracker 
techniques and actions for attacking computer systems, but employs them for 
explicitly political purposes. Jordan makes the point that the name IVDA does not 
mean the actions are necessarily undertaken by those acting alone, but instead that the 
nature of such actions means that they must be taken by individuals (i.e. they in no 
way rely on mass action), although they may be taken by many individuals acting in 
concert.73  JF’s anti-nuclear protest described above was an example of IVDA, which 
generally consists of infiltration of targeted networks and semiotic attacks (i.e. Web 
site defacements). The major difference between MVDA and IVDA, apart from those 
already described, is that MVDA activists rarely seek to hide their identities – through 
the use of pseudonyms (handles), for example – or cover their tracks. Advocates of 
MVDA seek to gather together large groups of people to take part in hacktions and 
thus to inspire public debate and discussion, and maintain that they have a right to 
protest even if some of those protests are illegal or bordering on same. Many of those 
using IVDA, on the other hand, act alone and prefer to remain anonymous, which 
raises issues of representativeness, authenticity, etc.74 Finally, there are also 
differences between those hacktivists who are devoted to the classical hacking ideal of 
free flow of information and therefore view DoS attacks as wrong in principle and 
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those who view MVDA as both direct non-violent action and important symbolic 
protest.75  
It is the disruptive nature of hacktions that distinguishes this form of ‘direct 
action Net politics’ or ‘electronic civil disobedience’ from other forms of online 
political activism. E-mail petitions, political Web sites, discussion lists, and a vast 
array of other electronic tools have been widely adopted as recruitment, organising, 
lobbying, and communicating techniques by social movements and political 
organisations of all sorts. Stefan Wray has described this type of use of the Internet by 
political activists as ‘Computerised Activism.’76  The hacktivist movement is 
different, because it does not view the Internet simply as a channel for 
communication, but also crucially as a site for action. It is a movement united by its 
common method as opposed to its common purpose.77  Those political causes that 
have attracted hacktivist activity range from campaigns against globalisation, 
restrictions on encryption technology, and political repression in Latin America to 
abortion, the spread of electronic surveillance techniques and environmental 
protection. Hacktivists are, therefore, arrayed across a far wider political spectrum 
than the techno-libertarian agenda with which committed ‘netizens,’ including the 
hacker fraternity, are often identified.  
Hacktivists, although they use the Internet as a site for political action, are not 
cyberterrorists. They view themselves as heirs to those who employ the tactics of 
trespass and blockade in the realm of real-world protest.  They are, for the most part, 
engaged in disruption not destruction. According to Carmin Karasic, the software 
engineer who designed the FloodNet program: “This isn’t cyberterrorism. It’s more 
like conceptual art.”78 Ronald Deibert is correct when he states that while Dorothy 
Denning’s definition of cyberterrorism is accurate and illuminating, her portrayal of 
hacktivism in her article ‘Activism, Hacktivism, Cyberterrorism’ is misleading. It 
employs the typical practice of conflating hacking with criminal activity. This is an 
association that not only ignores the history of hacking, but what many view as the 
positive potential of hacking as a tool for legitimate citizen activism.79 Denning 
appears to have adopted a more moderate position in her later work;80 Michael Vatis, 
on the other hand, continues to view hacktivists as perpetrators of low-level 
cyberterrorism.  
 
Cyber Crime versus Cyberterrorism   
The issue of computer crime was first raised in the 1960s, when it was realised 
that computers could easily be employed to commit a variety of frauds. Cyber crime 
is a more recent phenomenon, which was enabled with the introduction of the modem 
and the ability to remotely access computer systems, the explosion of e-commerce, 
and the resultant increase in financial transactions taking place via the Internet. 
Attempts to conflate cyberterrorism and cyber crime were inevitable. A UN manual 
on IT-related crime recognises that, even after several years of debate among experts 
on just what constitutes cyber crime and what cyberterrorism, “there is no 
internationally recognised definition of those terms.”81 Nevertheless, it is clear that 
while cyberterrorism and cyber crime both employ information technology, their 
motives and goals do not coincide. Cyber criminals have financial gain as there 
primary motive. 
“[W]e have entered a new age of computer crime. With the rise of E-
commerce, the development of the Net as a commercial entity, and 
unparalleled media attention, the profit motive for computer crime has entered 
the stratosphere. Recently, Janet Reno (former Attorney General of the United 
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States) dubbed it a ‘huge growth industry.’ She’s probably not wrong. What 
Reno and other agents of law enforcement are talking about is not hacking, it 
is crime. It is the kind of crime where people are hurt, money is stolen, fraud is 
committed, and criminals make money. It is not the grey area of electronic 
trespass or rearranged Web pages. It is not the world of electronic civil 
disobedience and ‘hacktivism’…In short, it [is] about money, and that makes 
it a different kind of crime.”82  
Areas in which individual criminals and criminal organisations have proven 
proficient in cyberspace include: the theft of electronic funds, the theft of credit card 
information, extortion, and fraud.83  Secondary to financial gain is the acquisition of 
information that can underpin the operations associated with making money. It is for 
this reason that transnational crime syndicates are probably more interested in 
maintaining a functioning Internet than attacking Internet infrastructures. In other 
words, organised crime groups view the Net as a tool, not a target. This is because 
many such organisations employ the Internet – and the public telecommunications 
network generally – as a vehicle for intelligence gathering, fraud, extortion, and 
theft.84 For example, as banks and other financial institutions increasingly rely on the 
Internet for their daily operations, they become more attractive targets for criminal 
activity. Having said that, criminal groups, such as drug traffickers, may seek to 
penetrate information systems to disrupt law enforcement operations or collect 
information on operations planned against them.85  
 This does not mean that the proceeds of cyber crime may not be used to 
support terrorism, but only that were this to occur it ought not to be classed as 
cyberterrorism per se.  
 
Computer as Target versus Computer as Tool 
In a probing article simply entitled ‘Cyberterrorism?’ (2002), Sarah Gordon 
and Richard Ford draw the reader’s attention to the differences between what they call 
“traditional cyberterrorism” and “pure cyberterrorism.” According to Gordon and 
Ford, traditional cyberterrorism features computers as the target or the tool of attack 
while pure cyberterrorism is more restricted as it is limited to attacks against 
computers, networks, etc.86 The author’s point out that both the media and the general 
public favour the definition encapsulated in the term “traditional cyberterrorism” 
while the focus in academia is on “pure cyberterrorism.” So while conceding 
Denning’s – and thence Pollitt’s – definition is “solid,” Gordon and Ford find the 
definition less than comprehensive: 
“First, [Denning] points out that this definition is usually limited to 
issues where the attack is against ‘computers, networks, and the information 
stored therein,’ which we would argue is ‘pure cyberterrorism.’ Indeed, we 
believe that the true impact of her opening statement (‘the convergence of 
terrorism and cyberspace’) is realised not only when the attack is launched 
against computers, but when many of the other factors and abilities of the 
virtual world are leveraged by the terrorist in order to complete his mission, 
whatever that may be. Thus, only one aspect of this convergence is generally 
considered in any discussion of cyberterrorism – an oversight that could be 
costly. Second, it is very different from the definition that appears to be 
operationally held by the media and the public at large.”87  
A number of authors agree with Gordon and Ford that cyberterrorism should 
encompass any act of terrorism that utilises “information systems or computer 
technology as either a weapon or a target.”88 Nelson et al include physical attacks 
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upon information infrastructures in this category.89 However, the same authors 
disagree with Gordon and Ford on the issue of leveraging the abilities of the virtual 
world to complete a terrorist mission. Gordon and Ford seek to place the latter activity 
squarely in the category of cyberterrorism. Nelson et al emphatically reject this 
approach. They identify two new categories into which this type of activity may be 
placed: ‘cyberterror support’ and terrorist ‘use’ of the Net. “Cyberterror support is the 
unlawful use of information systems by terrorists which is not intended, by itself, to 
have a coercive effect on a target audience. Cyberterror support augments or enhances 
other terrorist acts.” On the other hand, “terrorist use of information technology in 
their support activities does not qualify as cyberterrorism.”90  
 
Distinguishing Characteristics 
Kent Anderson suggests a three-tiered schema for categorising fringe activity 
on the Internet, utilising the terms ‘Use,’ ‘Misuse,’ and ‘Offensive Use.’ Anderson 
explains: 
Use is simply using the Internet/WWW to facilitate communications 
via e-mails and mailing lists, newsgroups and websites. In almost every case, 
this activity is simply free speech…Misuse is when the line is crossed from 
expression of ideas to acts that disrupt or otherwise compromise other sites. 
An example of misuse is Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks against websites. In 
the physical world, most protests are allowed, however, [even] if the protests 
disrupt other functions of society such as train service or access to private 
property…The same should be true for online activity. Offensive use is the 
next level of activity where actual damage or theft occurs. The physical world 
analogy would be a riot where property is damaged or people are injured. An 
example of this type of activity online is the recent attack on systems 
belonging to the world economic forum, where personal information of high 
profile individuals was stolen.91 
Combining Anderson’s schema with the definitions of cyberterrorism outlined 
by Pollitt and Denning, it is possible to construct a four-level scale of the uses (and 
abuses) of the Internet for political activism by unconventional actors, ranging from 
‘Use’ at one end of the spectrum to ‘Cyberterrorism’ at the other (see Table XX). 
Unfortunately, such a schema has not generally been employed in the literature or in 
the legislative arena. This is particularly disquieting given that the vast majority of 
terrorist activity on the Internet is limited to ‘Use.’92 
 
Table XX - Typology of Cyber Activism and Cyber Attacks 
Action Definition Source Example 
Use Using the Internet to facilitate 
the expression of ideas and 
communication(s) 
Internet users Emails, mailing lists, 
newsgroups, websites 
Misuse Using the Internet to disrupt or 
compromise Web sites or 
infrastructure 
Hackers, 
Hacktivists 
Denial-of-Service 
(DoS) attacks 
Offensive Use Using the Internet to cause 
damage or engage in theft 
Crackers Stealing data (e.g. 
credit card details) 
Cyberterrorism An attack carried out by 
terrorists via the Internet that 
results in violence against 
persons or severe economic 
Terrorists A terrorist group 
using the Internet to 
carry out a major 
assault on the New 
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damage York Stock Exchange 
 
Legislative Measures 
 In February 2001, the UK updated its Terrorism Act to classify “the use of or 
threat of action that is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt an 
electronic system” as an act of terrorism.93 In fact, it will be up to police investigators 
to decide whether an action is to be regarded as terrorism. Online groups, human 
rights organisations, civil liberties campaigners, and others condemned this 
classification as absurd, pointing out that it placed hacktivism on a par with life-
threatening acts of public intimidation.94  Furthermore, ISPs in the UK may be legally 
required to monitor some customers’ surfing habits if requested to do so by the police 
under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Notwithstanding, in the wake 
of the events of 9-11, US legislators followed suit. Previous to 9/11, if one 
successfully infiltrated a federal computer network, one was considered a hacker. 
However, following the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorised the 
granting of significant powers to law enforcement agencies to investigate and 
prosecute potential threats to national security, there is the potential for hackers to be 
labelled cyberterrorists and, if convicted, to face up to 20 years in prison.95  The 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was signed into law 
by US President George Bush in October 2001. The law gives government 
investigators broad powers to track wireless phone calls, listen to voicemail, intercept 
e-mail messages and monitor computer use, among others.  Clearly, policymakers 
believe that actions taken in cyberspace are qualitatively different from those taken in 
the ‘real’ world.  
It is not the Patriot Act, however, but the massive 500-page law establishing 
the US Department of Homeland Security that has the most to say about terrorism and 
the Internet. The law establishing the new department envisions a far greater role for 
the United States’ government in the securing of operating systems, hardware, and the 
Internet in the future. In November 2002, US President Bush signed the bill creating 
the new department, setting in train a process which will result in the largest reshuffle 
of US bureaucracy since 1948. At the signing ceremony, Bush said that the 
“department will gather and focus all our efforts to face the challenge of 
cyberterrorism.”96 The Department of Homeland Security merges five agencies that 
currently share responsibility for critical infrastructure protection in the United States: 
the FBI’s National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), the Defense Department’s 
National Communications System, the Commerce Department’s Critical 
Infrastructure Office, the Department of Energy’s analysis center, and the Federal 
Computer Incident Response Center. The new law also creates a Directorate for 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection whose task it will be to analyse 
vulnerabilities in systems including the Internet, telephone networks and other critical 
infrastructures, and orders the establishment of a “comprehensive national plan for 
securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States” including 
information technology, financial networks, and satellites. Further, the law dictates a 
maximum sentence of life-imprisonment without parole for those who deliberately 
transmit a program, information, code, or command that impairs the performance of a 
computer or modifies its data without authorisation, “if the offender knowingly or 
recklessly causes or attempts to cause death.” In addition, the law allocates $500 
million for research into new technologies, is charged with funding the creation of 
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tools to help state and local law enforcement agencies thwart computer crime, and 
classifies certain activities as new computer crimes.97  
 
Concluding Thoughts on Cyber-Terrorism 
In the space of thirty years, the Internet has metamorphosed from a US 
Department of Defense command-and-control network consisting of less than one 
hundred computers to a network that criss-crosses the globe: today, the Internet is 
made up of tens of thousands of nodes (i.e. linkage points) with over 105 million 
hosts spanning more than 200 countries. With an estimated population of regular 
users of over 600 million people, the Internet has become a near-ubiquitous presence 
in many world regions. That ubiquity is due in large part to the release in 1991 of the 
World Wide Web. In 1993 the Web consisted of a mere 130 sites, by century’s end it 
boasted more than one billion. In the Western world, in particular, the Internet has 
been extensively integrated into the economy, the military, and society as a whole. As 
a result, many people now believe that it is possible for people to die as a direct result 
of a cyberterrorist attack and that such an attack is imminent.  
On Wednesday morning, 12 September 2001, you could still visit a Web site 
that integrated three of the wonders of modern technology: the Internet, digital video, 
and the World Trade Center. The site allowed Internet users worldwide to appreciate 
what millions of tourists have delighted in since Minoru Yamasaki’s architectural 
wonder was completed in 1973: the glorious 45-mile view from the top of the WTC 
towers. According to journalists, the caption on the site still read ‘Real-Time Hudson 
River View from World Trade Center.’ In the square above was deep black 
nothingness. The terrorists hadn’t taken down the Net, they had taken down the 
towers. “Whereas hacktivism is real and widespread, cyberterrorism exists only in 
theory. Terrorist groups are using the Internet, but they still prefer bombs to bytes as a 
means of inciting terror,” wrote Dorothy Denning just weeks before the September 
attacks.98 Terrorist ‘use’ of the Internet has been largely ignored, however, in favour 
of the more headline-grabbing ‘cyberterrorism.’  
Richard Clarke, White House special adviser for Cyberspace Security, has said 
that he prefers not to use the term ‘cyberterrorism,’ but instead favours use of the term 
‘information security’ or ‘cyberspace security.’ This is because, Clarke has stated, 
most terrorist groups have not engaged in information warfare (read ‘cyberterrorism’). 
Instead, he admits, terrorist groups have at this stage only used the Internet for 
propaganda, communications, and fundraising (Wynne 2002). In a similar vein, 
Michael Vatis, former head of the US National Infrastructure Protection Center 
(NIPC), has stated that “Terrorists are already using technology for sophisticated 
communications and fund-raising activities. As yet we haven’t seen computers being 
used by these groups as weapons to any significant degree, but this will probably 
happen in the future.”99 According to a 2001 study, 75% of Internet users worldwide 
agree, they believe that ‘cyberterrorists’ will “soon inflict massive casualties on 
innocent lives by attacking corporate and governmental computer networks.” The 
survey, conducted in 19 major cities around the world, found that 45% of respondents 
agreed completely that “computer terrorism will be a growing problem,” and another 
35% agreed somewhat with the same statement.100 The problem certainly can’t shrink 
much, hovering as it does at zero cyberterrorism incidents per year. That’s not to say 
that cyberterrorism cannot happen or will not happen, but that, contrary to popular 
perception, it has not happened yet. 
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